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Abstract
Abstract: In social interaction, the facial expression of an opponent contains information that may influence the
interaction. We asked whether facial expression affects decision-making in the ultimatum game. In this two-person
game, the proposer divides a sum of money into two parts, one for each player, and then the responder decides whether
to accept the offer or reject it. Rejection means that neither player gets any money. Results of a large-sample study
support our hypothesis that offers from proposers with a smiling facial expression are more often accepted, compared to
a neutral facial expression. Moreover, we found lower acceptance rates for offers from proposers with an angry facial
expression. Keywords: decision-making, emotions, facial expressions, ultimatum game.
1 Introduction
An important aspect of social behavior is facial expres-
sion, as it contains valuable information that may influ-
ence an interaction (Fridlund, 1994). From the facial ex-
pression of an opponent, one may infer not only emo-
tional states (Ekman, 1982) but also information regard-
ing intentions, personality and complex social character-
istics (Horstmann, 2003). For example, from a smiling
expression of an opponent, intentions such as trust, co-
operation, or affiliation might be inferred, therefore fa-
cilitating approach behavior (Krumhuber & Manstead,
2009; Reed, Zeglen, & Schmidt, 2012; Seidel, Habel,
Kirschner, Gur, & Derntl, 2010; van’t Wout & Sanfey,
2008). By contrast, an angry facial expression might be
interpreted as threatening, spiteful, or malicious and asso-
ciated with intentions such as rejection or causing dam-
age, which subsequently might facilitate avoidance be-
havior (Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 2000; Horstmann, 2003;
Seidel et al. 2010). Therefore, we expect that facial
expressions have a direct influence on decision-making
(Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001) such as
in economic bargaining.
A typical paradigm investigating bargaining in eco-
nomic research is the ultimatum game. Here, a proposer
divides a certain amount of money (i.e., the pie) into two
Copyright: © 2013. The authors license this article under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
∗Department of Psychology I, Differential Psychology, Personal-
ity Psychology, and Psychological Diagnostics, Julius-Maximilians-
University Würzburg, Marcusstr. 9-11 97070 Würzburg, Germany.
Email: patrick.mussel@uni-wuerzburg.de.
†Department of Psychology, Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg,
Germany.
‡Department of Psychology, Julius-Maximilians-University
Würzburg, Germany.
parts, one for him- or herself, the other for a responder
(Güth et al., 1982). The responder has the choice to ac-
cept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both
players receive the amounts of money as suggested by
the proposer. However, if the offer is rejected, neither of
them gets anything. According to rational choice theory
(Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), responders should ac-
cept any proposal, as even little money is better than no
money. This assumes that decisions are made on rational
grounds, given that individuals have complete informa-
tion about the costs and benefits of all possible behavior
options. Therefore, they will strive to maximize their util-
ity, preferences, or values, such as maximizing monetary
outcome in an economic decision-making context. How-
ever, research shows that instead of maximizing personal
gain, individuals tend to reject unfair offers.
Given that the ultimatum game is a social interaction
between two agents, it is reasonable that decision making
is influenced by aspects other than monetary outcomes.
Recent research has thus far mainly focused on emotional
variables as moderating factors. For example, incidental
emotions, that is, emotions unrelated to the interaction,
have been found to predict decisions made in the dictator
game (Mellers, Haselhuhn, Tetlock, Silva, & Isen, 2010)
and the ultimatum game (Bonini et al., 2011; Harlé &
Sanfey, 2007; Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011;
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Moretti, & di Pellegrino,
2010). Furthermore, trait-related affect has been found
to affect decision-making in the ultimatum game (Dunn,
Makarova, Evans, & Clark, 2010; Harle & Sanfey, 2010).
Additionally, negative affect elicited by unfair offers has
been shown to increase the rejection rate (Hewig et al.,
2011). However, little is known about the influence of
social interaction with the other player.
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Figure 1: Task timeline for the ultimatum game.
In the present study, we ask whether facial expression,
an important aspect of social interaction, affects decision-
making in the ultimatum game. The facial expression of
proposers was manipulated on three levels: smiling, neu-
tral, and angry. As outlined above, facial expression con-
tains information that is used to formulate beliefs about
emotional states and intentions of an opponent, such as
the proposer in the ultimatum game. A smiling proposer
might be perceived as friendly, leading to the attribution
of positive intentions and hence approach behavior. Thus,
we expect that responders will accept offers more often
from a smiling proposer than from one with a neutral fa-
cial expression. By contrast, a proposer with an angry
facial expression might be perceived as unfriendly, ac-
companied by attributed negative intentions (such as pur-
posely causing harm by making an unfair offer), resulting
in avoidance behavior. Correspondingly, we expect that
fewer offers are accepted from an angry looking proposer
than from a proposer with a neutral facial expression.
2 Method
Sample. A total of 7,319 individuals were contacted
via WiSo-Panel, a web-based respondent pool with peo-
ple from all walks of life that offers monetary and non-
monetary compensation in return for survey participation
(Göritz, 2009). Individuals were briefly informed about
the purpose and content of the study. A total of 1,326
individuals agreed to participate and, subsequently, were
directed to an online administered experiment taking ap-
proximately 20 minutes. Participants were, on average,
39 years old (SD = 12.9); 61 % were female. The sample
comprises a wide range of educational levels, with 9 %
reporting 9 years of school as highest educational degree,
26 % O-levels, 34 % A-levels, 27 % a university degree
and 2 % a doctoral degree.
Task and procedure. Each participant played the ulti-
matum game repeatedly in a series of 42 one-shot trials
as a responder. Participants were told that they would
receive offers by participants who had played the ulti-
matum game previously. If they decided to accept the
offer, they both would get paid real money according to
the offer. However, if they decided to reject the offer,
both would receive nothing. Pictures of the proposers
were taken from two validated sets of facial expression
stimuli (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998; Tottenham,
Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002)1. We
used pictures from 42 proposers—half of them female.
For each of the 42 proposers, three pictures were used,
one with a smiling, one with a neutral, and one with
an angry facial expression. As the ultimatum game was
played as a one-shot game, each proposer made only one
offer to any participant, either with a neutral, a smiling,
or an angry expression on their face. Therefore, three
sets were created by randomly assigning the three facial
expressions of each proposer to one of the three lists, with
equal number of male and female proposers in each set.
Thereby, we controlled for the offer of the proposer; that
is, each proposer always made the same offer (e.g., 4
Cent), regardless of facial expression. One of the three
sets was randomly assigned to each participant. All anal-
yses reported below were repeated using set as additional
factor; we found no main effect for set, nor any interac-
tion with other variables.
Each trial began with a picture of the proposer (see Fig-
ure 1). After a fixation cross (500ms), the offer (a share
of 12 Cent) was displayed, graphically illustrated using
a pie chart. Offers differed in fairness on seven levels,
which ranged from 7 Cent (overly fair) to 1 Cent (very
unfair), with 6 Cent being a fair offer (i.e., half of the
money to the proposer and half of the money to the re-
sponder, respectively). The order of the 42 offers was
randomized separately for each participant. Participants
decided whether to accept or reject the offer while the of-
fer was displayed. After the decision, feedback was given
regarding the amount of money earned by the responder.
Participants were paid according to their decisions in the
ultimatum game; that is, they actually received the money
from accepted offers, with a maximum of C 1.68 (if all
offers were accepted).
Statistical analyses. Main analyses were conducted
using repeated measure analyses of variance (ANOVA).
Critical alpha level was set at .05. As with a large sam-
ple an alpha level of .05 might lead to the interpreta-
tion of negligible effects, we refrain from interpreting re-
sults that account for less than 1 % of variance. In all
ANOVAs, p-values were adjusted using the Greenhouse
Geisser correction if the Mauchly-test indicated a viola-
tion of sphericity-assumption. In such cases uncorrected
degrees of freedom are provided. For significant effects
in ANOVAs, partial eta-square (η²) values are reported.
Missing values occurred when participants did not re-
spond within the 3-second time frame. Missing values
1Amateur actors served as models; they prepared for the photo
shooting by rehearsing the different emotions and corresponding ex-
pressions for 1 hour before coming to the photo session. Actors were
told that they should try to evoke the emotion and to express it the way
that felt natural to them. While the pictures have been validated and
successfully applied in various settings, it should be noted that emotions
expressed by amateur actors may differ from those that result from real
emotion.
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Figure 2: Effects of offer (1 Cent to 7 Cent) and facial
expression (smiling, neutral, angry) on acceptance rate in
the ultimatum game; significant post hoc tests (p < .01)
for smiling vs. neutral (above) and neutral vs. angry (be-
low) are marked by an asterisk.





























occurred in less than 1 % and were substituted by mean
values computed across the responses of the same partic-
ipant and the same offer.
3 Results
Acceptance rates were analyzed using a 7*3 repeated
measures ANOVA, with the two factors “fairness” of the
offer at 7 levels (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Cent) and “facial ex-
pression” at three levels (smiling, neutral, angry). Re-
sults revealed a strong effect of fairness on acceptance
rates: F(6,7950) = 848.1; p < .01; η2 = .39. In line with
the ultimatum literature, fair offers (6 Cent) and overly
fair offers (7 Cent) were generally accepted (93 % and
92 %, respectively). As offers became more and more
unfair, the acceptance rate decreased to 44 % for offers
of 1 Cent; offers of 2 Cent were accepted in half of the
cases.
Furthermore, a significant effect of facial expression
was found: F(2,2650) = 139.9; p < .01; η2 = .10. Offers
from proposers with a smiling expression were more of-
ten accepted compared to neutral facial expression, and
the latter were more often accepted than offers from pro-
posers with an angry expression. Post hoc tests revealed
that all levels differed significantly at p < .01, there-
fore confirming our first hypothesis. Finally, a small
but significant interaction effect was found between fair-
ness and facial expression, F(12,15900) = 4.4; p < .01;
η
2 < .01: effects of facial expression were more strongly
pronounced for unfair (1, 2, and 4 Cent) and overly fair
(7 Cent) offers (see Figure 2). Specifically, post hoc tests
for facial expression within the seven levels of fairness
showed that neutral and smiling faces did not differ for
offers of 3, 5 and 6 Cent, whereas all other comparisons
were significant at p < .01.
Discussion
The present results connect with prior findings regarding
behavior in the ultimatum game: The majority of indi-
viduals reject offers despite the personal cost accompany-
ing this behavior, and rejection rates are a function of the
fairness of the offer, that is, the more unfair an offer, the
more likely it is rejected (Güth et al., 1982; Sanfey, 2007).
However, the present results also extend prior research:
Our novel hypothesis regarding a moderating effect of
proposer’s facial expression was confirmed. Specifically,
higher acceptance rates occurred for smiling compared
to neutral facial expression, and for neutral compared to
angry facial expression. This pattern of results is also ev-
idence for the notion that valence of the facial expression,
rather than just arousal, accounts for the results, as effects
for smiling and angry proposers are opposite in direction.
We also found that this effect was moderated by the size
of the offer. Particularly, the effect was largest for un-
fair and overly fair offers. We speculate that individuals
consider attributes of the social interaction especially in
situations that are unusual or unexpected, whereas in situ-
ations that are clear and expected (such as half the money
for the proposer, half for the responder) such attributes
might be less important for decision-making.
While the present research highlighted an impor-
tant factor influencing decision-making in the ultima-
tum game, future research is needed to shed light on the
mechanisms underlying this effect. We speculate that at-
tributes of the social interaction account for the observed
effect of facial expression on decision-making. However,
other factors might also be considered. For example, he-
donic tone has been found to impact decision-making,
and facial expression might affect hedonic tone2. Ad-
ditionally, aspects such as trustworthiness or reliability
of the proposer might be considered in future research.
However, there are methodological challenges in assess-
ing potential mediators of the effect of facial expression
2Recent research indicates that incidental emotions (i.e., emotions
elicited by stimuli unrelated to the task) such as pictures, videos, or
smells might influence decision making in the ultimatum game. How-
ever, findings are inconsistent. Indeed, several studies have found pos-
itive emotions such as amusement, joy, serenity, or happiness to be re-
lated to higher acceptance rates and negative emotions such as sadness,
disgust, or anger to higher rejection rates (Andrade & Ariely, 2009;
Harle & Sanfey, 2007; 2010). In contrast, other studies have found
higher acceptance rates after the induction of sadness (Moretti and di
Pellegrino, 2010), disgust (Bonini et al., 2011), or anger (Harle & San-
fey, 2010), which has been attributed to the motivational or moral com-
ponent of these emotions.
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on decision-making: As such intervening variables are
typically assessed after each trial their explicit measure-
ment might itself influence subsequent decision-making.
For example, asking participants after each offer whether
they had rejected the offer because the proposer was un-
friendly might shift participants’ attention to attributes of
the proposer. Therefore, it was important to first estab-
lish the general effect that facial expression influences
decision-making in a methodologically uncompromising
manner before moving on to the investigation of mediat-
ing variables.
In sum, the present research has identified an important
factor that influences economic decision-making. Rely-
ing on a large and heterogeneous sample, using pretested
and standardized stimuli, controlling for confounding
factors by randomization and counterbalancing, and im-
plementing contingent and real-life consequences due to
paying actual money we established that a proposer’s fa-
cial expression affects a respondent’s willingness to ac-
cept an offer. Our results show that bargaining behav-
ior is not purely rationally driven, but that social cog-
nitions need to be taken into account to more fully ex-
plain and predict behavior in economic bargaining, and
likely in other decision-making contexts. In our study,
a smile increased the likelihood of successful bargaining
and, therefore, the monetary payoff for both parties.
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